The sound of silence: Political accountability and libel law |
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| Institution: | 1. Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics, Welthandelsplatz 1, A-1020 Vienna, Austria;2. Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), Arsenal, Objekt 20, A-1030 Vienna, Austria;3. University of Vienna, Department of Economic Sociology, Oskar Morgenstern Platz 1, A-1090 Vienna, Austria;1. Department of Economics, Hanken School of Economics, PO Box 479, Fi-00101 Helsinki, Finland;2. SITE, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm, Sweden;3. Ifo Institute, Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany;4. Department of Economics, University of Munich, Munich, Germany;5. CESifo, Germany;6. IZA, Germany;1. Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Rome, Via del Castro Laurenziano 9, 00161, Rome, Italy;2. Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), Via A. Depretis 72, 00184, Rome, Italy;1. Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich, Plattenstrasse 14, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland;2. School of Business, Lucerne University of Applied Sciences and Arts, Zentralstrasse 9, 6002 Lucerne, Switzerland |
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| Abstract: | This paper explores the role played by press regulation in selecting the information mass media deliver to voters. The focus is on whether press regulation can reduce political corruption and increase voters' welfare. By endogenizing the response of the voters to information from the media, we clarify under which circumstances regulation reduces or increases corruption. We show that punitive laws can reduce political corruption only if the moral hazard problem dominates adverse selection and the punishment is large enough to deter the publication of some well-founded scandals. |
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