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国有经济腐败的委托代理因素分析
引用本文:张仁德,韩晶.国有经济腐败的委托代理因素分析[J].当代经济科学,2003,25(2):28-32.
作者姓名:张仁德  韩晶
作者单位:南开大学经济学系,天津,300071
摘    要:国有经济的结构特征可以用两大等级体系的委托代理链来描述 ,第一等级的委托人是全民 ,代理人是政府 ;第二等级的委托人是政府 ,代理人是国企经理。在经济中发挥实质性作用的是第二等级的委托代理关系。国有经济的腐败问题恰恰是第二等级的委托人和代理人的共谋租金的结果。我们认为 ,政府对企业行政上的超强控制是委托人与代理人共谋租金的纽带 ,而经济中监督激励的严重缺乏 ,则是腐败泛滥的重要原因。通过理论分析与模型分析 ,我们认为加强监督 ,减少政府干预企业经济 ,是解决腐败问题的关键。

关 键 词:双层代理  共谋租金  腐败  国有经济改革
文章编号:1002-2848(2003)02-0028-05
修稿时间:2003年1月8日

Trust-agency Factor Analysis on Corruption of State-owned Economy
ZHANG Ren-de,HAN Jing.Trust-agency Factor Analysis on Corruption of State-owned Economy[J].Modern Economic Science,2003,25(2):28-32.
Authors:ZHANG Ren-de  HAN Jing
Abstract:The structural features of state-owned economy can be described with the trust-agent chain classified into two types. All the people being the trustor and the government the agent as the first type, while the government being the trustor and the manager of the state-owned enterprise the agent as the second type. What essentially works is the second type of trust-agency relation. And the corruption of state-owned economy is the very result of the second type. The article holds that the strong control of the government over the enterprise administration is the bond linking the joint-sought lease rentals of the trustor and agent. And the serious lack of supervision and stimulation is an important cause of the unchecked corruption. The key to the problem, therefore, the paper thinks, is to strengthen the supervision and reduce the government interference.
Keywords:dual agency  joint-sought lease rentals  corruption  Reform of the state-owned economy
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