Condorcet cycles in bipartite populations |
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| Authors: | Yves Balasko Hervé Crès |
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| Institution: | (1) Département d'économétrie, Université de Genève, 102 Bd Carl Vogt, CH-1211 Genève 4, Switzerland, CH;(2) Université de Paris I, place de la Sorbonne, F-75005 Paris, France, FR;(3) Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA, US |
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| Abstract: | Summary. Simple majority voting between pairs of alternatives is used to aggregate individual preferences. The occurence of Condorcet
cycles is limited thanks to a principle of homogeneity on individual preferences. The restrictions induced on the domain of
the latters are weak: among the n! possible orderings of n alternatives, more than one half are admissible within a domain. The resulting aggregated preference has then a neglectable
probability of showing up cycles. We show moreover that the set of individual preferences can be `naturally' partitioned into
two such domains.
Received: June 17, 1996; revised version: April 15, 1997 |
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| Keywords: | JEL Classification Numbers: D71 D72 |
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