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乡镇企业改制的产权理论分析
引用本文:刘东. 乡镇企业改制的产权理论分析[J]. 产业经济研究, 2003, 0(2): 14-18
作者姓名:刘东
作者单位:南京大学,商学院,江苏,南京,210093
摘    要:乡镇企业改制的根本原因可以归结为集体企业中信息、决策和承担风险能力三者分离引起的决策效率问题 ,也可以归结为经营权交易中产权界定的困难。由经营者持大股的改制重新实现了两权合一。改制实质上是一场大规模的产权交易 ,改制顺利是因为经营者对财产未来收益流的估价高于公有产权代表的估价。它总体上是在自愿原则下进行的 ,其结果是双赢

关 键 词:产权边界  公共领域  交易费用  自愿交易
文章编号:1671-9301(2003)02-0014-05
修稿时间:2003-01-20

Analysis on Property Rights Institution Reform of Rural Enterprise
LIU Dong. Analysis on Property Rights Institution Reform of Rural Enterprise[J]. Industrial Economics Research, 2003, 0(2): 14-18
Authors:LIU Dong
Abstract:The Policy decision efficiency caused by separating of information and ability of policy decision and risk-taking is the basic cause of instititution reform in rural enterprise, which is also due to the difficulty of property rights bounds in transaction of management rights. The institution reform is in fact a large scale of property rights transaction. The higher evaluation of future revenue of manager than public ownership property rights makes institution reform smooth. Overall, institution reform follows one's free will and the result is "mutual-win".
Keywords:property rights boundary  public field  transaction cost  willing transaction
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