首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

高管持股的风险偏爱与R&D投入动机
引用本文:唐清泉,易翠.高管持股的风险偏爱与R&D投入动机[J].地质技术经济管理,2010(2):20-25.
作者姓名:唐清泉  易翠
作者单位:[1]中山大学管理学院,广东广州510275 [2]中国证监会深圳监管局,广东深圳518028
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目《我国企业R&D创新投入的风险与有效性研究》(70772084)和广东省普通高校人文社会科学“十一五”规划项目重点课题《三维一体的产学研创新模式研究》(06ZD63001)的阶段性研究成果.
摘    要:从研发投入风险和决策者风险偏爱出发,以委托代理理论为框架,分析高管持股对企业R&D投入的影响。研究结果显示:股东比管理者更愿意进行R&D投入,高管持股对企业R&D投入有激励作用,但这种激励在持股比例很低时不显著,只有当高管持股达到0.1%时,R&D投入强度才显著提高。这说明对高风险的研发投入,只有那些与企业长远发展相关的利益群体,首先是股东,其次是持股达到一定比例的高管才有动机加大R&D投入.促进企业的创新。

关 键 词:R&D投入  风险偏爱  高管持股  股权激励  股权集中度

Risk Preference of Executive Shareholders and R&D Investment Motivation
Tang Oingquan,Yi Cui.Risk Preference of Executive Shareholders and R&D Investment Motivation[J].Geological Technoeconomic Management,2010(2):20-25.
Authors:Tang Oingquan  Yi Cui
Institution:1.School of Business, Sun Yat-sen University, Ouangzhou 510275, China; 2.Shenzhen Bureau,China Seeurities Regulatory Commisson,Shenzhen 518028,China)
Abstract:From the viewpoints of R&D investment risk and risk preference of decision-makers and based on agency theory, this paper analyzes the impact of executive shareholders on enterprises' R&D investment. The study reveals that shareholders are more enthusiastic in R&D investment than managers and executive shareholders have incentive influence on enterprises' investment in R&D. However, only when the ratio of their share reaches 0.1%, R&D investment is obviously enlarged, otherwise the influence is less obvious, which indicates that high risk R&D investment has much more to do with interest groups who care about long-term development of enterprises; namely, shareholders, followed by the executive shareholders whose holding ratio has reached certain point, have motivation to increase R&D investment, prompting enterprises
Keywords:R&D investment  risk preference  executive shareholders  equity incentive  ownership concentration
本文献已被 维普 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号