供应商对不同风险偏好的销售商激励机制研究

利用委托-代理理论,在由单个供应商和单个销售商所组成的简单供应链中,分别研究了供应商和销售商在具有相同风险偏好和不同风险偏好下供应商对销售商的最优激励机制的设计问题,结果表明,在需求不确定且依赖于销售商努力水平的情形下,不同的风险偏好不会影响销售商的努力水平,但在整个激励机制的设计上,会有不同点,并且说明了销售商越是风险规避的,其承担风险的动力就越小。

Study on Incentive Policy of Suppliers to Distributors with Different Risk Partiality

Based on the principal-agent theory,the paper studies the designs of the optimal incentive mechanism of supplier to retailers respectively in two conditions that supplier and retailers have the same preference or different preference.