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信息不对称与机构操纵——中国股市机构与散户的博弈分析
引用本文:赵涛,郑祖玄. 信息不对称与机构操纵——中国股市机构与散户的博弈分析[J]. 经济研究, 2002, 0(7)
作者姓名:赵涛  郑祖玄
作者单位:南京大学金融学系 210093(赵涛),复旦大学经济学院 200433(郑祖玄)
摘    要:中国股市中 ,股票二级市场价格常常在短期内发生剧烈变化。这种现象产生的原因在于 ,在信息不对称情况下 ,机构通过操纵上市公司基本面信息来影响股票交易价格 ,以获得超额收益。鉴于机构之间信息不对称程度远远低于机构与散户之间信息不对称程度 ,发展机构投资者可以最终减少市场操纵行为 ,机构在投资者中所占比例与市场整体被操纵程度的关系可以用倒“U”形曲线表示。

关 键 词:股价波动  信息不对称  机构操纵  中国股市

Asymmetric information and manipulate stock in institutions behavior
Zhao Tao , Zheng Zuxuan. Asymmetric information and manipulate stock in institutions behavior[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2002, 0(7)
Authors:Zhao Tao & Zheng Zuxuan
Abstract:The purpose of this research is to reveal the causation of stock prices volatility in Chinese stock markets. In an environment of asymmetric information, scrutiny reveals that manipulate accounting earnings in institutions behavior influence stock price, and institutions gain excess returns in this way. The a symmetric information between institutions is less than that between institutions and individual investors. The development of institutions could depress manipulate stock in institutions behavior. A reversed “U” demonstrates the relation between the amount of institution in proportion to those of investors and the degrees of manipulate stock in institutions behavior.
Keywords:Stock prices volatility  Asymmetric information  Manipulate stock in institutions behavior  Chinese stock markets
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