Ex-post efficient permit markets: a detailed analysis |
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Authors: | Frank C. Krysiak |
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Affiliation: | 1. Faculty VIII, Economics and Management Technische Universit?t Berlin, Stra?e des 17. Juni 135, 10623, Berlin, Germany
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Abstract: | This paper provides a detailed analysis of ex-post efficient permit markets. After a short review of institutional designs that can achieve ex-post efficiency under uncertainty and asymmetric information, we analyze the effects of an ex-post efficient regulation on the expected costs of the regulated firms, on their investment behavior, and on the incentives for strategic behavior on imperfectly competitive permit markets. Also we inquire about the budget effects of the regulation. Our results show that ex-post efficient permit markets have considerable benefits beside the direct increase in expected social welfare. |
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Keywords: | Tradeable permits Uncertainty Ex-post efficiency Investment Imperfect competition |
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