The Interrelationship Between Managerial Ownership and Board Structure |
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Authors: | M. Ameziane Lasfer |
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Affiliation: | The author is from the Cass Business School, City University, London. |
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Abstract: | Abstract: The paper tests the hypothesis that high managerial ownership entrenches managers by allowing the CEO to create a board that is unlikely to monitor. The results show a strong negative relationship between the level of managerial ownership and corporate governance factors, such as, the split of the roles of the CEO and the Chairman, the proportion of non-executive directors, and the appointment of a non-executive director as a Chairman. I also find that companies with low managerial ownership are more likely to change their board structure to comply with the Cadbury (1992) recommendations. The results suggest that managers, through their high ownership, choose a board that is unlikely to monitor. Overall, the findings cast doubt on the effectiveness of the board as an internal corporate governance mechanism when managerial ownership is high. |
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Keywords: | corporate governance ownership structure board structure financial performance |
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