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违约损害赔偿的经济学分析
引用本文:李运杨.违约损害赔偿的经济学分析[J].南京财经大学学报,2011(3).
作者姓名:李运杨
作者单位:山东大学威海分校法学院;
摘    要:从经济学的角度看,违约行为并不总是一件坏事,当违约的收益大于或等于因违约而要承担的违约责任时,当事人就有违约的激励。否之,则有履约的激励。违约损害赔偿作为价格高低可以影响当事人选择违约亦或履约的激励。违约损害赔偿的经济目标是鼓励有效率的违约,阻止无效率的违约。通过三种方案的比较,将可得利益损失纳入违约损害赔偿之内,是唯一可以实现违约损害赔偿经济目标,满足法律的效率要求的方案。

关 键 词:违约损害赔偿  信赖利益  可得利益  效率  最大化  

Economic Analysis of Compensation for Breach of Contract
Li YunYang.Economic Analysis of Compensation for Breach of Contract[J].Journal of Nanjing University of Finance and Economics,2011(3).
Authors:Li YunYang
Institution:Li YunYang(Law School,Shandong University at Weihai,Weihai 264209,Shandong)
Abstract:From the perspective of economic,the breach of contract is not always a bad thing,if the proceeds of default is greater than or equal to the liability for breach of contract,the parties will have incentive to default.If the proceeds of default is less than the liability for breach of contract,the parties will have incentive to perform.As a price,the level of compensation for breach of contract will have an affect on incentives of the parties to default or perform.The economic goals of compensation for breac...
Keywords:compensation for breach of contract  reliance interests  available interests  efficiency  maximize  
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