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The signaling role of trade credit: Evidence from a counterfactual analysis |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Finance, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, China;2. School of Management, Shandong University, China;3. School of Economics and Finance, Massey University, New Zealand;1. Central Bank of Chile, Agustinas 118, 8340454 Santiago, Chile;2. Hunter College & Graduate Center, City University of New York, 695 Park Ave, New York NY 10065, United States;1. Department of Finance, NUS Business School, National University of Singapore, 15 Kent Ridge Drive, BIZ 1 #7-63, 119245, Singapore;2. Department of Accounting, School of Economics and Management, Beihang University, 37 Xueyuan Road, Haidian District, Beijing, 100191, P.R. China;3. Division of Accounting, Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University, 50 Nanyang Avenue, 639798, Singapore |
| Abstract: | We quantify the signaling effect of trade credit on bank credit in a sample of US firms. Our identification strategy relies on the signaling model by Biais and Gollier (1997) and accounts for the endogeneity due to the possibility of self-selection and the simultaneity between banks’ and firms’ credit decisions. We find that: (i) firms’ self-select into trade credit; (ii) firms’ decision to use trade credit results in a higher chance of obtaining bank credit and a lower cost than the counterfactual ones they would have faced if not using trade credit. |
| Keywords: | Trade credit Asymmetric information Counterfactual Signaling Bank credit Cost of credit Endogenous switching regression |
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