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Cooperative oligopoly equilibrium |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Instituto de Ciencia de Materiales de Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas. Cantoblanco, 28049 Madrid, Spain;2. Departamento de Física de Materiales, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Avenida Complutense s/n, 28040 Madrid, Spain;3. Departamento de Física, Escuela Politécnica Superior, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Avenida Universidad 30, Leganés, 28911 Madrid, Spain;1. Key Lab of Animal Ecology and Conservation Biology, Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Science, Datun Road, Chaoyang, Beijing 100101, PR China;2. School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology, Kochi 780-8515, Japan |
| Abstract: | Oligopoly cooperation is investigated in an industry with N firms: each firm selects its own output. We show that such oligopoly problems have the same structure as problems of allocating public goods since each firm views its own output as a private good while viewing the outputs of others as public bads. This leads to ‘cooperative oligopoly equilibria’ which are the Lindahl equilibria of the oligopoly model. Agreements are modeled by the selection of a mechanism or ‘game form’ which obeys certain axioms. Under the postulated axioms we show the equivalence of agreed allocations with the set of oligopoly equilibria.It is argued that the principle of ‘Lindahl agreements’ may have wider applications. |
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