Stochastic imitation in finite games |
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Authors: | Jens Josephson Alexander Matros |
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Institution: | a Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, and Centre de Refèrencia en Economia Analítica (CREA), Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27, 08005, Barcelona, Spain;b Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, 4P36 Posvar Hall, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA |
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Abstract: | In this paper we model an evolutionary process with perpetual random shocks, where individuals sample population-specific strategy-payoff pairs and imitate the most successful behavior. For finite n-player games we prove that in the limit, as the perturbations tend to zero, only strategy-tuples in minimal sets closed under single better replies will be played with positive probability. If the strategy-tuples in one such minimal set have strictly higher payoffs than all outside strategy-tuples, then the strategy-tuples in this set will be played with probability one in the limit, provided the minimal set is a product set and the sample is sufficiently large. |
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Keywords: | C72 C73 |
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