Investment subsidies and time-consistent environmental policy |
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| Authors: | Abrego, Lisandro Perroni, Carlo |
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| Affiliation: | !["*"]("/math/bigstar.gif") International Monetary Fund, Washington DC
!["{dagger}"]("/math/dagger.gif") Department of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK; email: c.perroni{at}warwick.ac.uk. |
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| Abstract: | We describe a model of dynamic pollution abatement choices withheterogeneous agents where, due to the presence of a distributionalobjective and to the absence of incentive-compatible compensationmechanisms, the choice of a second-best level of emission taxationis time-inconsistent. In this model, we investigate whetherinvestment subsidies can act as a substitute for policy commitment. |
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