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上市公司增发新股机制的经济学分析
引用本文:杨柏.上市公司增发新股机制的经济学分析[J].商业研究,2005(12):21-23.
作者姓名:杨柏
作者单位:重庆大学,经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400044
摘    要:上市公司增发新股是一种正常的融资行为,然而分析表明,我国上市公司增发新股信号传递机制是失败的,即绩差型上市公司比绩优型上市公司更容易增发成功。因此,为了提高增发过程中信号传递的有效性,促进我国证券市场再融资过程的健康发展给出一些政策建议。

关 键 词:信号传递  增发新股  博弈模型
文章编号:1001-148X(2005)12-0021-02
修稿时间:2003年7月7日

The Economics Analysis of Listed Companies' Mechanism in Issuing New Shares
YNAG Bai.The Economics Analysis of Listed Companies'''' Mechanism in Issuing New Shares[J].Commercial Research,2005(12):21-23.
Authors:YNAG Bai
Abstract:This paper establishes a signaling game model in the process of issuing new shares by listed companies.it analyzes the micromechnism in issuing new shares from a viewpoint of economics.The analysis shows that the signaling process of issuing new shares is not appropriate,that is to say,it is easier for the listed companies with bad performance to succeed in issuing new shares than those with good performance.Therefore,some constructive suggestions on policy are proposed in the paper in order to improve the validity of the signaling in the process of issuing new shares and promote the refinancing development in Chinese's securities market.
Keywords:signaling game  new share issue  game model
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