Optimal fees in internet auctions |
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| Authors: | Alexander Matros Andriy Zapechelnyuk |
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| Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA;(2) Kyiv School of Economics and Kyiv Economics Institute, Kyiv, Ukraine |
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| Abstract: | An auction house runs a second-price auction with a possibility of resale through re-auctions. It collects listing and closing
fees from the seller. We find the fees which maximize the revenue of the auction house. In particular, we show that the optimal
listing fee is zero. Our findings are consistent with the policies of eBay, Amazon, Yahoo, and other Internet auctions.
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| Keywords: | Internet auctions Auctions with resale Auction house Listing fee Closing fee |
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