制度演进的原动力研究及对我国法律制度建设的启示

自约翰·梅纳德·史密斯以来演化博弈理论得到了社会科学普遍的肯定,协调演化博弈理论研究集团内部由于内力或者外力的作用导致集团的进化,这与人类社会的制度演进及其相似,制度演进实际上就是演进的收益大于成本而不断调整各经济主体（或者集团）利益关系的过程。本文利用协调演化博弈理论的分析方法对制度变迁的起点、环境、制度变迁的内生动力加以分析,提出导致制度变迁的原动力——企业、个人之间博弈关系的分析思路,就这一分析方法探讨了在制度变迁过程中我国法制建设应注意的问题。

A Study of the Motive Power of Institution Evolution and the Inspiration to Chinese Legal System Construction

Evolution game theory has been commonly agreed by social science since John.Smith.Coordinating evolution game theory studies group evolution that is resulted from internal force or external force,which is similar to the institution evolution of human society.Institution evolution,in fact,is a process to coordinate the profit relationship of each economic subject(or group) when the evolution profit is bigger than cost.With the analysis method of coordinating evolution game theory,this paper analyzes the starting point,the environment and the internal motive power of institution evolution,puts forward that the analyzing method of motive power that results in institution evolution——the game relationship of enterprise and individual.Further,this paper discusses the important points that should be focus on in Chinese legal system construction in institution evolution.