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Selective Distribution,Refusal to Sell and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission
Authors:Michael A. Utton
Affiliation:Department of Economics , University of Reading , PO Box 218, Whiteknights, Reading, RG6 2AA, UK
Abstract:Refusal to sell to ‘unauthorised’ dealers is an integral part of a selective distribution system. Under such a system manufacturers authorise only those dealers meeting their specific requirements. Where the market involved is ‘reasonably competitive’ it is widely recognised that manufacturers, dealers and consumers can gain. The British Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) has been criticised for its interpretation of what constitutes a ‘reasonably competitive’ market. In a recent report into the supply of fine fragrances the issue was again central to its findings that the selective distribution system was not against the public interest. The European Commission has also recently granted exemption from Article 85 for the distribution system operated by the leading firms. We argue that the MMCs analysis of competition was again flawed in this case and that the danger to the consumer and new entrants is compounded by the Europe–wide exemption.
Keywords:Refusal to sell   Selective distribution   Vertical restraints index  ‘Grey’ market supplies   Reasonable competition.  JEL classifications: LI 2, L42, L66.
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