Confusion and learning in the voluntary contributions game |
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Authors: | Ralph-C. Bayer Elke Renner Rupert Sausgruber |
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Affiliation: | 1. School of Economics, University of Adelaide, Nexus 10, SA 5005, Adelaide, Australia 2. School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, UK 3. Department of Economics & Statistics, University of Innsbruck, Universit?tsstrasse 15, 6020, Innsbruck, Austria 4. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, DK-1455, Copenhagen K, Denmark
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Abstract: | We use a limited information environment to assess the role of confusion in the repeated voluntary contributions game. A comparison with play in a standard version of the game suggests, that the common claim that decision errors due to confused subjects biases estimates of cooperation upwards, is not necessarily correct. Furthermore, we find that simple learning cannot generate the kind of contribution dynamics commonly attributed to the existence of conditional cooperators. We conclude that cooperative behavior and its decay observed in public goods games is not a pure artefact of confusion and learning. |
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