Evolutionary selection of ‘chivalrous’ conventions in coordination games without common expectations |
| |
Authors: | Pier Luigi Sacco Marco Sandri |
| |
Affiliation: | aDepartment of Economics, University of Florence, Florence, Italy;bInstitute of Economics, University of Verona, Verona, Italy |
| |
Abstract: | We study an evolutionary game-theoretic model where players have to choose within a predetermined set of mixed strategies in a coordination game. Players are of two different kinds, male and female. No common expectations assumption is made; players tend therefore to adopt the strategy that yields larger than average expected payoffs for their kind. In this framework, every stable stationary point of the population dynamics can be interpreted as the emergence of a particular convention. A classification of the possible conventions is provided; conditions for their emergence are determined. |
| |
Keywords: | JEL classification: C79 |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|