Multiple-unit English auctions |
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Authors: | Flavio M. Menezes |
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Affiliation: | Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Commerce, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia |
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Abstract: | This paper examines the outcome of an ascending-price multiple-unit auction. Two bidders, facing continuous, downward-sloping demand functions, participate in the auction of some divisible objects. The auctioneer starts the process by announcing an initial price and asking both bidders to submit sealed-bids of desired quantities. The auctioneer increases the price until the total amount bid for is less than the total supply. We compute the outcome of this auction game under full information and suggest that this mechanism may not maximize expected revenue. |
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Keywords: | Multiple-unit auctions Privatization auctions |
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