代理人寻租行为的博弈分析--以海关对免税企业的监管为例

在国家海关税收优惠政策的执行过程中,针对一些免税企业逃避海关监管,倒卖减免税商品所形成的寻租行为,本文运用完全信息静态博弈和不完全信息动态博弈的分析工具,通过对博弈的参与双方———海关和免税企业最优均衡策略的讨论,得出结论:1.免税企业逃避监管,非法倒卖寻租的概率和海关监管成本呈正相关关系,和本身所享受的已减免关税与进口环节税之和呈负相关关系;2.海关监管的概率与寻租企业倒卖减免税货物牟利所支付成本负相关,与免税进口的先进设备所带来的利润负相关;3.海关的实际监管技术水平愈高、查验率愈高,则免税企业倒卖免税商品的行为收益就愈少,积极性就愈低。

Game Analysis of the Seeking Rent by Agents --Cases of Supervision to Duty- free Enterprises by Customs

While granted some customs duty preferential policies,some duty-free enterprises try to evade the customs supervision,selling duty-free goods and reduced-duty goods.With the analysis methods of complete information static game and incomplete information dynamic game,the article tries to find the optimal policy between the two participants,customs and duty-free enterprises,and then draws such conclusions as the followings:1) The beliefs of the evasion of customs supervision and illegal sales by duty-free enterprises is directly proportional to customs supervision cost and inversely proportional to the total sum of reduced or exempted duty and import link tax granted to them.2)The beliefs of customs supervision is inversely proportional to the cost of those seeking rent enterprises leading by their illegal sales of the goods whose duty has been reduced or exempted,and also to the profit brought by their importation of advanced equipments free of duty.3) Duty-free enterprises will not cut down the illegal sales of duty-free goods unless they notice the practical supervision by customs.