Exclusive territories and performance dimensions in industrial distribution channels

There are two main approaches to studying vertical restraints in distribution channels: the anti-competitive and the efficiency approach. This article sets out to analyze the effects of exclusive territories agreements on performance levels in the distribution channel by proposing a number of hypotheses based upon these two approaches and by testing them with paired data from a sample of 116 manufacturer-dealer relationships from the Spanish industrial market. Results show that manufacturers and dealers perceive higher role performance levels in their partners in relationships characterized by exclusive territories. In a similar way, both manufacturers and dealers obtain higher levels of business performance in exclusive territories relationships, but we found no support for a direct effect of this vertical restraint on business performance. Instead, this effect is completely mediated by the higher levels of role performance associated with the exclusive territories agreement. Thus, empirical findings suggest that the economic outcomes achieved in ET relationships are due not to the presence of monopoly rents, but rather to the better role performance of the participants.