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环境治理中政府间利益博弈与机制设计
引用本文:关华,齐卫娜.环境治理中政府间利益博弈与机制设计[J].财经理论与实践,2015(1):100-104.
作者姓名:关华  齐卫娜
作者单位:1. 天津大学 管理与经济学部,天津 300072; 河北经贸大学 工商管理学院,河北 石家庄 050061;2. 河北经贸大学 工商管理学院,河北 石家庄,050061
基金项目:河北省社会科学基金项目,2013年度河北省科技计划项目,河北经贸大学科研基金项目
摘    要:在环境治理中,中央政府和地方政府作为“经济人”为争取自身利益最大化展开竞争博弈,效用目标差异是导致其竞争的根本原因。为实现双方互利共赢的帕累托最优,应设计相应的激励机制以实现地方政府从竞争走向合作,实现地方利益与区域利益的统一,经济增长和环境协调一致,促进社会可持续发展。

关 键 词:环境治理  利益博弈  机制设计

The Game of Interest Between the Government and the Mechanism Design in Environmental Governance
GUAN Hu,QI Wei-na.The Game of Interest Between the Government and the Mechanism Design in Environmental Governance[J].The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics,2015(1):100-104.
Authors:GUAN Hu  QI Wei-na
Abstract:In environmental governance,the central government and the local government ac-ted as an"economic man"for the maximization of their own interests to compete in the game.U-tility goal difference is the fundamental cause of its competition.In order to achieve a win-win as the Pareto optimum,we design a corresponding incentive mechanism to realize the local gov-ernment from competition to cooperation,the unity of local interests and regional interests,coor-dination of economic growth and the environment,and promote the sustainable development of society.
Keywords:Environmental governance  Game of interest  Mechanism design
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