Electoral competition and endogenous barriers to entry |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Ifo Institute — Leibniz-Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, Poschingerstr. 5, D-81679 Munich. Germany;2. University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Department of Economics, Lange Gasse 20, 90403 Nuremberg, Germany;1. Polytechnique Montréal, C.P. 6079, succ. Centre-Ville, Montréal, QC H3C 3A7, Canada;2. CIRANO, Montréal, QC, Canada;3. Department of Economics, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5, Canada;4. School of Public Policy and Administration, Department of Economics, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6, Canada;5. CESifo, Munich, Germany;1. Max Planck Institute of Economics, Kahlaische Str. 10, 07745 Jena, Germany;2. DSE, University of Verona, Via dell''Artigliere 19, Verona, Italy;3. Department of Economics, Lund University, P.O. Box 7082, 220 07 Lund, Sweden;1. University of Bayreuth, Universitätsstraße 30, 95440 Bayreuth, Germany;2. CREMA — Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, Südstrasse 11, 8008 Zürich, Switzerland;3. University of Fribourg, Bd. de Pérolles 90, 1700 Fribourg, Switzerland |
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| Abstract: | As institutions matter for political and economic outcomes, they are (at least partly) shaped by the interests of political agents acting under these limitations. However, empirical evidence documenting such endogenous change of institutions is scarce. We address the issue by examining the link between the degree of electoral competition and the design of ballot access restrictions in the United States. Exploiting exogenous variation in electoral competition at the state level induced by the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965, our main finding is that ballot access rules have been systematically tightened in response to stronger electoral competition. |
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