Sequential coordination,higher-order belief dynamics and the E-stability principle |
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| Institution: | 1. Young Researchers and Elite Club, Neyshabur Branch, Islamic Azad University, P.O. Box 97175-613, Neyshabur, Iran;2. New Materials Technology and Processing Research Center, Department of Chemistry, Neyshabur Branch, Islamic Azad University, Neyshabur, Iran;1. Laboratoire d’Anticorrosion, Matériaux Et Structure (LAMES), Faculté des Sciences, Université 20 Août 1955, BP 26 Route El-Hadaïk, Skikda 21000, Algeria;2. Research Center in Industrial Technologies (CRTI), Algiers, Algeria;3. Ceramics Laboratory, Frères Mentouri Constantine 1 University, Road Ain El-Bey, 25000 Constantine, Algeria;1. School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, 200433, China;2. Department of Economics, Ryerson University, Toronto, ON M5B2K3, Canada;3. China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, 100081, China;1. Faculty of Light Industry and Chemical Engineering, Dalian Polytechnic University, Dalian 116034, China;2. State Key Laboratory of Inorganic Synthesis and Preparative Chemistry, College of Chemistry, Jilin University, Changchun 130012, China |
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| Abstract: | This paper explores convergence in higher-order beliefs – otherwise called eductive stability – when coordination is sequential, that is, when each agent of a given type fixes his own actions after observing the ones of earlier types in a given order. The presence of sequential types enhances expectational coordination in the case of strategic substitutability, but not in the case of strategic complementarity. In particular, eductive stability can be obtained for any degree of substitutability, provided the number of sequential types is large enough. Therefore, sequential coordination opens up to the possibility that eductive convergence occurs at the same conditions of adaptive convergence, in accordance to the E-stability principle. |
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| Keywords: | Eductive learning Rational expectation equilibria Rationalizable set Learning in macroeconomics Coordination games |
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