Consumer privacy in oligopolistic markets: Winners,losers, and welfare |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, Duke University, United States;2. Stuart School of Business, Illinois Institute of Technology, United States;3. Managerial Economics Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, United States;1. Faculty of National Economy, University of Economics in Bratislava, Dolnozemska cesta 1, 852 35 Bratislava, Slovak Republic;2. Sam M. Walton College of Business, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR 72701, United States;3. Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866, United States;1. Morrison Chair of Agribusiness, Morrison School of Agribusiness, W.P. Carey, School of Business, Arizona State University, Mesa, AZ 85212, United States;2. Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, United States;1. University of Maryland & NBER, United States;2. Illinois Institute of Technology, United States |
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| Abstract: | Motivated by the unprecedented availability of consumer information on the Internet, we characterize the winners and losers from potential privacy regulation in the context of four commonly-used oligopoly models: a linear city model, a circular city model, a vertical differentiation model, and a multi-unit symmetric demand model. We show that while there are winners and losers as a result of privacy enforcement, the parties who stand to benefit and the parties who stand to lose, as well as whether social welfare is enhanced or diminished, largely depends on the specific economic setting under consideration. |
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