Strategic Behavior and Efficiency in the Common Property Extraction of Groundwater |
| |
Authors: | Santiago J Rubio Begoña Casino |
| |
Institution: | (1) Department of Economic Analysis, University of Valencia, Avda. de los Naranjos, Edificio Departamental Oriental, 46022 Valencia, Spain;(2) Department of Economic Analysis, University of Valencia, USA |
| |
Abstract: | Externalities that arise from privateexploitation of groundwater are analyzed by comparing socially optimal and privateextraction.
Open-loop Nashequilibrium and stationary Markov feedbackequilibrium in nonlinear strategieshave been computed to characterize
privateextraction. The use of thesetwo equilibrium concepts allows us todistinguish between cost andstrategic externalities as long as the open-loop solutioncaptures only the cost externality, and the feedback solution capturesboth.
The results show thatstrategic behavior increases theoverexploitation of the aquifer. However, ifthe groundwater storage capacity
is large, thedifference between the sociallyoptimal and private extraction is negligible. |
| |
Keywords: | common property resources differential games groundwater extraction linear versus nonlinear strategies stationary Markov feedback equilibrium strategic externality |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |