Entry, Prices, and Investment in Regulated Industries |
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Authors: | Gianni De Fraja |
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Institution: | (1) University of York and C.E.P.R. Dept. of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, Heslington, York, YO1 5DD, U.K |
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Abstract: | The paper studies how the optimal regulatory policy is affected by the possibility of unregulated firms entering the market. In such cases, the regulator may prefer to limit price and cost reductions in the regulated incumbent. The extent to which this happens is shown to depend on the extent of the regulator's commitment: if it commits to a chosen policy, then the market outcome following entry is less competitive than it would be without commitment: price and production costs are both higher. We also show that, unlike the natural monopoly case, incentives for cost reducing investment are stronger when the regulatory policy has a short regulatory interval. |
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