Managing the international commons: Resource use and pollution control |
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Authors: | Anastasios Xepapadeas |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Crete, Perivolia 74100 Rethymnon, Crete, Greece |
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Abstract: | The simultaneous management, in an international context, of free-access renewable resources and transboundary pollution, is examined in a dynamic game framework. First-best outcomes under international cooperation are determined and compared to noncooperative outcomes when countries follow linear Markov strategies. An international policy consisting of taxes on emissions and harvesting, with international redistribution of tax receipts, is used to achieve the cooperative solution. In addition, side payments may be required to prevent free riding and thus make the international policy implementable.Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the International WorkshopEconomic Aspects of International Water Resources Utilization in the Mediterranean Basin, Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei, Milan, October 1993, and the Fifth Annual Conference of EAERE, Dublin, June 1994. I would like to thank Peter Berck, Charles Kolstad, Mordechai Schechter, and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments. |
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Keywords: | Transboundary pollution open-access resource differential game Markov strategies international taxes/reimbursements free riding |
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