Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies: A note |
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| Authors: | Rajat Deb Shinji Ohseto |
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| Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75275-0496, USA (e-mail: rdeb@mail.smu.edu), US;(2) Department of Economics, Ritsumeikan University, Kusatsu, Shiga 525-8577, JAPAN (e-mail: ohseto@ec.ritsumei.ac.jp), XX |
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| Abstract: | Summary. Serizawa [3] characterized the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, no exploitative, and non-bossy social choice functions in economies with pure public goods. He left an open question whether non-bossiness is necessary for his characterization. We will prove that non-bossiness is implied by the other three axioms in his characterization. Received: October 17, 1997; revised version: January 19, 1998 |
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| Keywords: | and Phrases: Social choice function Strategy-proofness Individual rationality Non-bossiness. |
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