首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

供应商之间基于声誉模型的合作博弈分析
引用本文:许鹏,王红春.供应商之间基于声誉模型的合作博弈分析[J].物流科技,2014(10):1-3.
作者姓名:许鹏  王红春
作者单位:北京建筑大学 经济与管理工程学院,北京,100044
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目,项目编号61203148;北京市哲学规划资助项目,项目编号13JGC096。
摘    要:供应链上同级供应商之间因其合作竞争关系,经常需面对策略应对与选择的难题。文章通过引入声誉模型,假定供应商为理性的不再是共同认知,分阶段讨论是否存在一个非理性概率p使其不受阶段T的影响,始终选择合作。在归纳计算后发现,在合作博弈次数T3的前提下,当供应商的信誉度p≥4/7时,他将总是选择合作;反之当p4/7时,其背叛行为则有可能出现。因此只需根据合作供应商以往的信誉是否低于p=4/7这一临界点,即可知选择何种博弈策略最为有利。

关 键 词:声誉模型  供应商联盟  合作博弈

Cooperative Game Analysis Between Suppliers Based on the Reputation Model
XU Peng,WANG Hong-chun.Cooperative Game Analysis Between Suppliers Based on the Reputation Model[J].Logistics Management,2014(10):1-3.
Authors:XU Peng  WANG Hong-chun
Institution:(School of Economics and Management Engineering. Beijing University of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Beijing 100044, China)
Abstract:Because of the co-opetition relations hips among suppliers at the same level in the supply chain. They often need to face the problem of strategy selection. By introducing a reputation model in this paper, that supplier are rational is no longer common, discussing in stages, whether there is a irrational probability p make it be not affected by phase of T, and always choose cooperation. After computation induction, on the premise of the number T〉3 of cooperative game,when the supplier credibility p≥4/7, the will always choose cooper-ation; On the contrary, when p〈4/7, the treachery may be happen. Therefore it just reference whether the credibility of suppliers is below the critical point of p=4/7, could know which kind of strategy is the most favorable.
Keywords:reputation model  suppliers  cooperative game
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号