Robust political economy |
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Authors: | Peter T Leeson J Robert Subrick |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV, 26506-6025;(2) George Mason University, Carow Hall 11C, 4400 University Drive, MSN 1D3, Fairfax, VA, 22030-4444 |
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Abstract: | This paper introduces the idea of “robust political economy.” In the context of political economic systems, “robustness” refers
to a political economic arrangement's ability to produce social welfare-enhancing outcomes in the face of deviations from
ideal assumptions about individuals' motivations and information. Since standard assumptions about complete and perfect information,
instantaneous market adjustment, perfect agent rationality, political actor benevolence, etc., rarely, if ever actually hold,
a realistic picture and accurate assessment of the desirability of alternative political economic systems requires an analysis
of alternative systems' robustness. The Mises-Hayek critique of socialism forms the foundation for investigations of robustness
that relax ideal informational assumptions. The Buchanan-Tullock public choice approach complements this foundation in forming
the basis for investigations of robustness that relax ideal motivational assumptions.
JEL Code B53, P16, P26 |
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Keywords: | Austrian economics Public choice Robustness |
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