Cost of monitoring and risk taking in the money market funds industry |
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Abstract: | Increasing the cost associated with gathering information can hamper the monitoring activity of the market even when information remains public. Using the 2015 US money market funds (MMFs) reform as a quasi-natural experiment, I find a positive effect of removing information requirements over credit ratings on the allocation by MMFs toward securities rated as second tier. The effect is driven by monitored MMFs catering to retail investors and by monitored MMFs that do not voluntarily report credit ratings after the reform. The verfied increase in the relative demand by MMFs for second tier securities is associated with a decrease in the spread paid at issuance by second tier commercial paper. |
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Keywords: | Money market mutual funds Information acquisition Rating-based regulation Commercial paper Clientele effects |
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