Pooling my personal account: Income responses to the payroll tax in China

Developing countries collect not only a far lower share of GDP in taxes, but also less payroll taxes than rich countries. This paper explores income responses to the payroll tax by evaluating the 2006 pension reform that subtracted 3 percentage points of employees' Defined Contribution account in China. First, our estimate of total income elasticity with respect to the pension rate is larger than 2, implying a lower optimal payroll tax rate than in rich countries. Second, we separate total income into labor and non-labor income, and show significant income shifting from labor to non-labor income. Third, we provide suggestive evidence that income responses to the pension reform are from evasion rather than real responses. We emphasize the necessity of administrative capacity for developing countries to extend the pension system. Remarkably, sharing the employer payroll tax with employees may be a self-enforcement mechanism, similar to the value-added tax, of the payroll tax.