| 激励扭曲与基于知识合约的团队生产力 |
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| 引用本文： | 雷宏振,李垣,廖貅武. 激励扭曲与基于知识合约的团队生产力[J]. 中国工业经济, 2005, 0(6): 98-104 |
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| 作者姓名： | 雷宏振 李垣 廖貅武 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 陕西师范大学国际商学院,陕西,西安,710062
2. 西安交通大学管理学院,陕西,西安,710049 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目“基于知识共享的组织柔性与创新研究”(批准号70472039) |
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| 摘 要： | 对企业团队生产力的传统激励模式主要是基于委托人既定条件下的控制权安排展开的，但由此造成的不确定性导致了激励扭曲，存在成员监督条件下的隐性激励合同虽然有利于减少这种扭曲，但通过建立一种包括团队成员知识共享与创造并参与收益分享的知识性合约，则可以有效解决自我激励的难题，从而提高团队生产力。
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| 关 键 词： | 激励扭曲 团队生产力 知识合约 收益分享 |
| 文章编号： | 1006-480X(2005)06-0098-07 |
Incentive Distortion and Team Productivity Based on Knowledge Contract |
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| LEI Hong-zhen,LI Yuan,LIAO Xiu-wu. Incentive Distortion and Team Productivity Based on Knowledge Contract[J]. China Industrial Economy, 2005, 0(6): 98-104 |
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| Authors: | LEI Hong-zhen LI Yuan LIAO Xiu-wu |
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| Abstract: | The traditional incentive mode mostly based on the principal identified condition dominate power arrange for the enterprise team productivity which bring on incentive distortion because of the uncertainty. A concealed contract with the condition of peer monitoring may reduce the distortion extent. But building a sort of knowledge contract including the knowledge share among team members and profit share participation, team can settle the problem of self-promotion effectively to improve the team productivity. |
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| Keywords: | incentive distortion team productivity knowledge contract profit share |
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