The anatomy of block accumulations by activist shareholders |
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| Affiliation: | 1. King''s College London, London WC2B 4BG, UK;2. University of Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus;3. MIT Sloan School of Management, Cambridge, MA, USA;1. Shanghai Univ. of Finance & Economics, China;2. University of Manitoba, Canada;3. Fanhai Int''l School of Finance, Fudan Univ., China;1. Finance group, D''Amore-McKim School of Business, Northeastern University, Boston, 02115, MA, USA;2. Finance area, Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 27599, NC, USA |
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| Abstract: | We conduct a large-sample analysis of investor activism in the US based on all 13D filings from 2001 to 2016. While hedge funds represent the largest filer group, the sample contains a diverse set of other activist shareholders. This raises the question to what extent other investors perform a governance role similar to hedge funds. Based on target firms' outcome variables, like announcement returns of activist campaigns and changes in operating performance measures, we find surprisingly few differences. However, hedge funds play a special role when it comes towards takeovers. They stimulate monitoring activities among relatively larger firms and they help to set payout policies. |
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