Groundwater management under heterogeneous land tenure arrangements |
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Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, Lahore University of Management Sciences, Khayaban-e-Jinnah, Phase 5 DHA, Lahore, Pakistan;2. Department of Economics, University of California, Riverside, 900 University Avenue, Riverside, CA 92521, USA;3. School of Public Policy, University of California, Riverside, 900 University Avenue, Riverside, CA 92521, USA |
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Abstract: | We develop a groundwater extraction model that considers the Marshallian inefficiency associated with sharecropping and use data from Pakistan to simulate the impact of an open access regime and of optimal management on groundwater extractions, the state of the aquifer, and annual net benefits through time. We also evaluate a price instrument as a mechanism of inducing optimal extractions. Under both open access and optimal management, we observe notable differences in groundwater extractions and the water table level between the tenure model (which considers the behavior of both owner cultivators and sharecroppers) and the baseline model (which includes the behavior of only owner cultivators). We also find a modest difference in the aggregate net benefits generated by the two models. The results offer new insights—vis-à-vis land tenure heterogeneity—into the evaluation of more effective policies for groundwater management and aquifer sustainability. |
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Keywords: | Q25 Q15 H23 Q58 |
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