| 论战略性贸易政策与制度环境的稳定性 |
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| 引用本文： | 任重,朱延福.论战略性贸易政策与制度环境的稳定性[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2005(4):10-14. |
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| 作者姓名： | 任重 朱延福 |
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| 作者单位： | 中南财经政法大学,经济学院,湖北,武汉,430060 |
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| 摘 要： | 战略性贸易政策理论主张政府应积极干预存在超额利润或技术外溢效应的寡头垄断产业以实现本国社会净福利的最大化.然而最终是否能实现预期的干预效果与制度环境密切相关.本文通过研究表明保持一个稳定的制度环境对欲实施战略性贸易政策的国家而言是最优的选择.
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| 关 键 词： | 战略性贸易政策 制度环境 动态博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1003-5230(2005)04-0010-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年4月10日 |
On the Strategic Trade Policy and the Stability of Institutional Environment |
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| REN Zhong,ZHU Yan-fu.On the Strategic Trade Policy and the Stability of Institutional Environment[J].Journal of Zhongnan University of Finance and Economics,2005(4):10-14. |
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| Authors: | REN Zhong ZHU Yan-fu |
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| Abstract: | The strategic trade policy suggests the government interfere with the oligopolistic industries that exist excessive profit or technological spillovers to maximize national net welfare. Nevertheless, whether this effect can be finally achieved highly depends on the institutional environment. This paper expresses views on that a stable institutional environment is an optimal choice to the country that intends to implement strategic trade policy. |
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| Keywords: | Strategic Trade Policy Institutional Environment Dynamic Games |
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