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不完全契约下经理和债权人之间的代理成本问题研究
引用本文:沈向光,赵春荣,郑利群.不完全契约下经理和债权人之间的代理成本问题研究[J].财会通讯,2006(12).
作者姓名:沈向光  赵春荣  郑利群
作者单位:秦皇岛职业技术学院 河北北戴河066100
摘    要:自詹森和麦克林提出代理成本理论以来,理论界对代理成本理论的研究,全部集中在股东与经理之间的股权代理成本和股东与债权人之间的债权代理成本。而关于经理和债权人之间的代理成本问题,几乎是空白。本文通过对经理作为“合同收益者”与“剩余收益者”双重属性的分析,提出了关于经理和债权人之间代理成本问题研究的基本思路。

关 键 词:不完全契约  经理  债权人  代理成本

Research on the Agent Cost Problem Between Director and Creditor Under the Uncompleted Contract
Shen Xiang guang Zhao Chun Rong Zheng Liqun.Research on the Agent Cost Problem Between Director and Creditor Under the Uncompleted Contract[J].Communication of Finance and Accounting,2006(12).
Authors:Shen Xiang guang Zhao Chun Rong Zheng Liqun
Abstract:Since Janson and Macrin had raised the agent cost theory, the researches in the theory field are all concentrated on the share agent cost between shareholder and director as well as the creditor's rights agent cost between shareholder and creditor, however, the agent cost problem between director and creditor is almost a blank space. This essay particularly analyse the agent cost problem between director and creditor by treated director as both 'contract beneficiary' and 'surplus beneficiary'.
Keywords:Uncompleted contract Director Creditor Agent cost
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