市场信号传递、逃课成本和人才度量费用--对大学生逃课现象的经济学分析

该文运用经济学的基本方法分析大学生逃课现象。分析表明，逃课现象是经济行为人在课程市场信号传递强度及逃课成本的约束下追求自身利益最大化的选择行为。课程市场信号传递强度取决于市场用人单位在选择人才时确定某种信号进行度量时预期收益与度量费用的比较，预期净收益越大，被选择作为市场信号的可能性越大．其市场信号传递强度越大。逃课成本取决于课程的性质特点、考核方式和制度约束的软硬程度。在此基础上，提出了避免逃课现象的几点启示。

The Market Signal Transmitting, the Cost of Playing Truant and the Expenses of Talents'''' Measuring

This text uses the basic economics method to analyze the phenomenon of university students' playing truant.It indicates that this phenomenon reflects a person's choice behavior of pursuing one's own maximum interests under the restraints of the market signal transmitting intensity and the cost of playing truant.The transmitting signal of market depends on the comparison between the prospective earnings and the expenses of talents' measuring.It is expected that the larger the net income is,the greater the possibility being chosen as the market signal is,with stronger signal transmitting intensity.The cost of playing truant depends on the characteristic nature of courses,examining way and system-restriction degree.On this basis,the author proposes some enlightenment for avoiding the phenomenon.