Labour market recruiting with intermediaries |
| |
Authors: | Paul Schweinzer |
| |
Institution: | 1.Department of Economics,University of Bonn,Bonn,Germany |
| |
Abstract: | We consider a Rothschild–Stiglitz–Spence labour market model and employ a centralised mechanism to coordinate the efficient
matching of workers to firms. This mechanism can be thought of as operated by a recruitment agency, an employment office or
head hunter. In a centralised descending-bid, multi-item procurement auction, workers submit wage-bids for each job and are
assigned stable jobs as equilibrium outcome. We compare this outcome to independent, sequential hiring by firms and conclude
that, in general, a stable assignment can only be implemented if firms coordinate to some extent.
|
| |
Keywords: | Matching Multi-item auctions Sequential auctions |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|