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In Defense of Boards
Authors:Silvia  Dominguez-Martinez Otto H  Swank Bauke  Visser
Institution:University of Amsterdam Roetersstraat 11 1018 WB Amsterdam The Netherlands;
Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tinbergen Institute Burgemeester Oudlaan 50 3062 PA Rotterdam The Netherlands;
Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tinbergen Institute Burgemeester Oudlaan 50 3062 PA Rotterdam The Netherlands
Abstract:It is often assumed that bad corporate performance means a bad CEO. The task of a board of directors is then simple: dismiss the executive. If it fails to do so, the board is said to be indolent. We take a kinder approach to observed board behavior and point to the problems even well-intended boards would encounter. They face the twin task of disciplining and screening executives. We analyze the nature of the retention contract a board uses to discipline and screen executives. Consistent with empirical observation, we find that executives may become overly active to show their credentials, and that the link between bad performance and dismissal is weak.
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