The economics of union organization: Efficiency,information and profitability |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Economics and Finance, Universidad EAFIT, Carrera 49 7 Sur-50, Avenida Las Vegas, Medellín, Colombia;2. Department of Economics, Lehigh University, 403 Rauch, Bethlehem, PA 18015, USA;3. Department of Economics, University of Memphis, 411 Fogelman Clsrm Bldg., Memphis, TN 38152, USA;1. Geriatric Unit, Internal Medicine Service, Hospital Universitari de Bellvitge, Bellvitge Biomedical Research Institute, IDIBELL, L''Hospitalet de Llobregat, Barcelona, Spain;2. Primary Healthcare Centre ‘El Plà’ CAP-I, Sant Feliu de Llobregat, Barcelona, Spain;3. Clinical Laboratory Service L''Hospitalet, Barcelona, Spain;4. Global Institute of Public Health and Health Policy, Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences, Universitat Internacional de Catalunya, Barcelona, Spain;5. Institute for Diabetes in Older People (IDOP), Bedfordshire University, UK;6. Geriatric Service, Getafe University Hospital, Madrid, Spain;1. Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2424 Maile Way, Honolulu, HI 96821, United States;2. East-West Center, 1601 East-West Road, Honolulu, HI 96848-1601, United States;3. Departments of Demography and Economics, University of California, 2232 Piedmont Ave, Berkeley, CA 94720, United States;1. Department of Economics, Ewha Womans University, Seoul, Republic of Korea;2. Department of Finance, College of Business, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306-1110, United States;3. Division of Global Human Resources, (Regional Economics Major), Kangwon National University, Kangwon-do, Republic of Korea;1. Department of Economics and Finance, Brunel University, London UB8 3PH, United Kingdom;2. University of Minho, Department of Economics and Economic Policies Research Unit (NIPE), Campus of Gualtar, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal;3. London School of Economics, LSE Alumni Association, Houghton Street, London WC2 2AE, United Kingdom |
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| Abstract: | This article presents a game-theoretical model of union organization that highlights the role played by efficiency and asymmetric information as determinants of unionization and questions commonly-held assumptions about the effect of firm profitability on unionization decisions. In the model, employers set wages taking into account the effect of their choices on workers' incentives to unionize. As a result of employers' strategic wage setting, collective bargaining emerges in equilibrium only if it increases surplus or if there is asymmetric information about the consequences of unionization. While unionization is usually assumed to be more likely in more profitable firms, the model shows that the probability of unionization will be higher in firms with lower rents. It also shows that the union wage premium and unionization will tend to be negatively correlated. |
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