论WTO安全例外对单边贸易制裁的有限治理——基于“俄罗斯过境限制案”的分析

对成员方援引GATT1994第21条安全例外条款采取的单边贸易制裁,DS512案专家组除了明确争端解决机构的管辖权外,还提出善意解释基本安全利益和最低限度合理性两项要求,一定程度上肯定了争端解决机构在该条款具体适用问题上的审查权。然而,从专家组对条款的解读来看,其审查明显具有弹性,基于安全例外问题的双重属性,基本安全利益和最低限度合理性的定性模糊以及制度供给的不足,实际意味着争端解决机构对援引安全例外条款的介入审查有限,即有限治理。在应对美国以安全例外之名施加钢铝关税制裁时,理性看待WTO规则治理的效果,并在规则治理之外,设置WTO改革议题,以宏观制度层面的对话磋商促进具体争议的解决,无疑是一条更为合理的路径。

Limited Governance of WTO Security Exceptions on Unilateral Trade Sanctions:A Study Based on Russia-Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit

According to the report of the Panel on Russia-Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, when unilateral trade sanctions were legalized by applying GATT 1994 Article 21 security exception clause, it was nailed down that WTO Panels had jurisdiction to such kind of case. They also proposed two requirements of good faith interpretation of essential security interests and minimum requirement of plausibility. As we can see, the Panel’s jurisdiction is characterized by flexible governance. Actually, the Panel has limited power to review the security exception clause in the cases, based on the dual attributes of security exceptions,the qualitative ambiguity of essential security interests and minimum requirement of plausibility and the lack of WTO law. In response to the US imposing tariffs on steel and aluminum on the grounds of security exceptions, it is necessary to rationally reconsider the effects of WTO Panels’ judgement on such issues. Besides, it is more effective to bring up relevant WTO reform issues and promote settlement of specific disputes through dialogue and consultation at the macro-institutional level.