Uniqueness of the index for Nash equilibria of two-player games |
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| Authors: | Srihari Govindan Robert Wilson |
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| Affiliation: | (1) Economics Department, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario N6A 5C2, CANADA, CA;(2) Business School, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5015, USA, US |
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| Abstract: | Summary. Given a map whose roots are the Nash equilibria of a game, each component of the equilibrium set has an associated index, defined as the local degree of the map. This note shows that for a two-player game, every map with the same roots induces the same index. Moreover, this index agrees with the Shapley index constructed from the Lemke-Howson algorithm. Received: May 30, 1996; revised version June 25, 1996 |
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| Keywords: | JEL Classification Number: C72. |
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