Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining |
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Authors: | Ilya Segal |
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Institution: | Stanford University |
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Abstract: | This paper examines the profitability of three types of integration in a cooperative game solved by a random-order value ( e.g. the Shapley value). Collusion between players i and j is a contract merging their resources in the hands of one of them, say i . This contract can be represented as a combination of exclusion, which lets i exclude j 's resource but not use it himself, and inclusion, which lets i use j 's resource but not exclude j from it. This representation yields a third-difference condition on the characteristic function that determines the profitability of collusion, generalizing existing results for specific games. Namely, collusion is profitable unprofitable] when the complementarity of the colluding players is reduced increased] by other players. |
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