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后股权分置时期中国上市公司独立董事激励研究
引用本文:邱金辉,张恒. 后股权分置时期中国上市公司独立董事激励研究[J]. 财经问题研究, 2006, 0(9): 51-56
作者姓名:邱金辉  张恒
作者单位:西安交通大学,经济与金融学院,陕西,西安,710061;成都信息工程学院,经济贸易系,四川,成都,610225
摘    要:股权分置改革之前,独立董事制度在中国公司治理中发挥的作用并不理想,原因是多方面的。在后股权分置,完善独立董事制度有了新机遇。独立董事制度本身的不完善给公司治理带来的新的代理问题值得关注,委托代理理论以激励相容来解决该问题。独立董事制度中独立性变量的引入,使得独立董事制度的激励设计不同于激励经理人。除了固定薪金的激励外,声誉激励在独立董事制度中的应用显得格外重要.而独立董事行业协会制度的建立保证了声誉激励的实施。

关 键 词:独立董事  独立性  声誉激励  行业协会
文章编号:1000-176X(2006)09-0051-06
收稿时间:2006-06-10
修稿时间:2006-06-10

Studying Incentive to Independent Director System in China's Listed Companies in Post-equity Division
QIU Jin-hui,ZHANG Heng. Studying Incentive to Independent Director System in China's Listed Companies in Post-equity Division[J]. Research On Financial and Economic Issues, 2006, 0(9): 51-56
Authors:QIU Jin-hui  ZHANG Heng
Abstract:The cause which independent director system takes low effects in China corporation governance is various in ex-equity division.There is opportunity to improve independent director in post-equity division.We notice especially new agency problems which the faultiness of independent director system brings in corporation governance.Principle-agency theory solves this problem by incentive compatibility.Independent director's special status-i.e.independence variable induct-does not get independent director incentive designing the same as managers.This paper puts out that besides fixed salary,we attach importance to reputation incentive in independent director system,and which we establish independent director trades society which assure reputation incentive.
Keywords:independent director system    independence    reputation incentive    trades society
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