部分契约、控制权转移与揭示机制

区别于完全契约和不完全契约理论,基于对名义控制权和实际控制权的区分,Aghion等(2002;2003)提出部分契约概念,强调代理人人力资本的重要性和实际控制权的可转移性.在此基础上,我们放松Aghion等(2003)的研究假设,基于贝叶斯法则对该理论做一般化分析并对不同状态下转移控制机的机制效力进行比较.我们强调在更一般的情况下,除了引人价格机制以外,引入声誉作为保障该信息揭示机制效力的激励约束机制是必要的且比价格机制列为适用.该理论对于解释信誉,授权等理论问题,以及指导中国公司治理实践具有参考价值.

Partial Contracting, Transfer of Control and Revelation Mechanism

Based on the differences between formal authority and real authority,Aghion et al(2002,2003)put forward the concept of partial contracts which differ from comprehensive contracts and incomplete contracts and emphasize the impact of contracts on the underlying game between contracting parties and real authority.They also mentioned that through the transfer of real control to agents and according to the exercise of control agents,the principles will obtain the information of cooperation of the agents and this kind information disclosure mechanism is effective.On this basis,we broaden the assumptions of Aghion et al(2003)and conduct a general theoretical analysis based on Bayesian rule and evaluate the effectiveness of these contracts.We emphasize that in a more general context,the introduction of reputation as an incentive and constraint mechanism is necessary and more applicable than the price mechanism.This theory would be valuable for the explanation of credibility and delegation,as well as the practices of corporate governance in China.