| 论住宅开发中开发商与顾客之间的信息不对称 |
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| 引用本文： | 肖继文,张巍.论住宅开发中开发商与顾客之间的信息不对称[J].基建优化,2006,27(2):13-16. |
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| 作者姓名： | 肖继文 张巍 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆大学建设管理与房地产学院,重庆,400045 |
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| 摘 要： | 从信息经济学的角度出发,通过定量与定性分析,建立委托-代理的最优激励合同机制解决开发商与购房者之间的信息不对称问题。弱化住宅开发中由于严重的信息不对称情况导致的逆向选择①和道德风险②。以期在开发商和顾客之间建立一个良好的信息沟通桥梁。
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| 关 键 词： | 信息不对称 信号显示 私人信息 委托—代理 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-7717(2006)02-0013-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-02-12 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006年2月12日 |
A Research on Asymmetric Information Between Developer and Customer in the Housing Development |
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| XIAO Ji-wen,ZHANG Wei.A Research on Asymmetric Information Between Developer and Customer in the Housing Development[J].Optimization of Capital Construction,2006,27(2):13-16. |
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| Authors: | XIAO Ji-wen ZHANG Wei |
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| Institution: | Faculty of Construction Management and Real Estate, Chongqing University, Chongging 400045 |
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| Abstract: | This paper will try to put forward the corresponding solutions to the problem of a asymmetry of information using the quota and the qualitative analysis from the information economics' within the framework of principal-agent theory,and abate the degree of a diverse selection and moral hazard leaded by asymmetric information in housing development.meanwhile,we can establish a communicate way between the developer and the customer. |
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| Keywords: | a asymmetry of information signal demonstration personal information Principal-agent |
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